Introduction
It is a popular view that spoken or written language is a "surface" phenomenon, that its logical structure and meaning reside in an underlying base language, and that complex transformations relate these two levels. Reasoning takes place at the base level with the surface language providing only an input/output function. Put into practice, this view would require difficult transformations from surface to base language and back again. Even more difficult would be providing an intelligible account in the surface language of reasoning performed in the base language. This paper is motivated by an alternative view [13] , viz., that the surface language directly conveys logical structure and meaning, and that the base level and transformations are unnecessary. Reasoning conducted in the surface language will be termed "surface reasoning" to distinguish it from deduction performed in some base language such as clausal form of first-order logic.
The paper describes LN, a logic designed for surface reasoning. LN is characterized by absence of variables and individual constants. Singular predicates assume the role of both individual constants and free variables. The role of bound variables is played by predicate functors called "selection operators." Like natural languages, LN is implicitly many-sorted. £N does not have an identity relation.
The elimination of bound variables borrows from Quine's Predicate Functor Logic [5, 9] . The elimination of the identity relation and the central role of singular predicates are inspired by Sommers' Term Calculus [6, 7, 10, 11] . But the principal influence is the recent work on generalized quantifiers in natural language [1, 2] . This work gave rise to the conviction underlying £N, viz., that monotonicity properties constitute a unifying principle in surface reasoning.
Two claims are made for £N: (i) the language is structurally similar to natural language in the sense that there exist well-translatable grammars [3] relating £N and natural languages; (ii) the logic is similar to natural language reasoning in that the monotonicity principle captures an essential and important element of natural language reasoning.
The paper is organized as follows. First the syntax and semantics of £N are defined.
Next a complete axiomatization is given. Then several theorems establishing the monotonicity principle are presented. The monotonicity principle is shown to subsume unification and resolution. To support the claim that £N is structurally similar to natural language, a fragment of English and its translation to £N are defined a To support the claim that £N mirrors reasoning in natural language, several example problems are solved and discusseda
In the sequel, superscripts and parentheses are dropped whenever no confusion can result. Metavariables are used as follows: Si, S range over S; Rn ranges over R n ; P ranges over P; X, Y, Z, Xi, }Ii, Zi, Wi range over .eN; and ..:y"n, yn, zn, W n , 1 ,n range over n-ary expressions of LN.
An interpretation of £:v is a pair I = (V,:F) where V is (\, nonempty set and F is a mapping defined on P satisfying:
Note tllat va = {()}, so :F(RO) must be either {()} or 0.
in I (written I FaX) iff one of the following holds: It can be shown that the pure predicate calculus without identity (PP) is equivalent to a proper subset of LN, which in turn is equivalent to a proper subset of the pure predicate calculus with identity (PPI). The first inclusion is shown by defining a recursive translation function r which, given a well-formed subexpression of PP and a binding environment (a string over the set of variables of PP), computes the corresponding subexpression of LN. The translation of a closed wff 4> E 'P'P is then defined to be r(cf>, E). That the inclusion is proper is proved by a routine application of Padoa's Principle to show that PP cannot express the property of being a sillgular predicate. The second inclusion is shown similarl)T.
In subsequent sections the following abbreviations are used to improve readability.
An
It is easy to see that: 
Some useful theorems
The main results of this section are two monotonicity theorems. These theorems establish the monotonicity properties of quantifiers (which include the resolution principle). Monotonicity is the foundation of surface reasoning. In addition, several other properties of quantifiers, including conservativity, are proved.
In the proofs of this section it often will be necessary to introduce singular predicates Sit, ... ,Sin (n~1) that are distinct and have no previous occurrences in the proof.
To avoid unnecessary repetition, this circumstance will be conveyed by the phrase:
Let Sit, ... ,Sin be fresh. To further reduce unnecessary repetition, axiom BT and rule MP will be used implicitly whenever that use is clear from the context. Most of the theorems of this section can be succinctly stated as schemas, i.e., using schematic letters or metavariabIes. The proof of such a schema is concerned with an arbitrary instance, or in the case of a refutation, with some particular instance, of the schema.
To reduce proliferation of symbols, the same letters are used in the proof, but with the understanding that in the proof these letters represent fixed instances. 
The first theorem generalizes axiom BT. The following theorem provides a useful distributive property.
Zl)) where n = max(l, m), and either (i) h = m~k /\ j = k~I or (ii) j = 1 ::;
By a similar argument, Si, ... SitZI n SilX1 n··· n SijX j • Using axiom BT and rule ( In this section an English fragment is offered in support of the claim that LN is structurally similar to natural language.
)). Now by the induction hypothesis, ("T)9(("Xj
The syntax of the fragment and its translation to £N are defined by an attribute grammar. To make the grammar brief, some inessential simplifications are adopted.
Morphological rules necessary to achieve proper noun and verb forms are omitted.
Only the conjunction and is shown; or can be dealt with similarly. The grammar is allowed to be syntactically ambiguous.
To further enhance the presentation, the following "syntactic sugar" is added to .eN.
The attribute grammar follows. T is the translation mapping. In view of the incomplete understanding of human language, it cannot be proved that £N has the same structure as natural language; but the above grammar demonstrates that a well-translation [3] can be defined between £N and a simple English fragment.
This grammar is of further interest because of the interpretation of English it induces.
It deviates from Montagovian semantics [1, 13] in several respects. Most significant is the absence of term phrases, which denote (in a purely extensional Montagovian semantics) sets of sets of individuals. In the fragment defined above, determiners are functors that combine directly ,vith two predicates; a determiner and one predicate do not form a phrase. Determiners thus denote binary relations on subsets of the universe of individuals. The fragment has no phrases that denote sets of sets. As a dividend, proper nouns always denote individuals -or, more precisely, singleton sets rather than sometimes individuals and other times sets of sets of individuals [1] .
Relative clauses are always unary predicates. Thus for example the sentence every dog that chases a cat barks can be given the de dicto reading every (dog n some cat chase) bark. In contrast to this, the de re reading (which incidentally lies outside the above grammar) would be Sicat n every (dog nSi chase)bark. In general only a partial model is needed. If a partial model entailed by the premises contains the desired conclusion, then a direct proof has been constructed. If a model entailed by the premises conjoined with the denial of the conclusion does not exist (i.e., the attempt to build such a model fails), then an indirect proof has been constructed.
Each step in building a model adds another fact about the kinds of individuals in the world entailed by the problem statement, that is, about the subsets of the model unIverse.
Exercises from introductory logic
These examples are taken from Sommers [11] . They are intentionally simple so that the details of each step in the reasoning process can be given. Each step consists of a .eN expression, its justification, and a direct English equivalent. To make the Boolean character of reasoning in LN apparent, "universal closure" is implicit. For example, AT(D~M F) is abbreviated Again the proof can be presented graphically. Using the same conventions as before, the Hasse diagram is shown in Figure 2 . In this example, inferences are based on conversion (axiom C1) as well as the monotonicity principle. That the premises and the denial of the conclusion have no model is seen from the contradictory circumstance
RFnRF~T.
This example illustrates that an indirect proof can be viewed as a process of model elimination (in contrast to model building), with the result that all models are finally eliminated. Theorem to accomplish unification without complexities such as the "occur-check."
Discussion
Although psychological theories of human reasolling abound, it can be said with confidence that human reasoning is not well enough understood to permit anything to be proved about it. Consequently, the claim that LN mirrors natural language reasoning must be argued on intuitive grounds. The claims that LN mirrors natural language structure and natural language reasoning have been argued on intuitive grounds using examples.
The state of knowledge in cognitive science does not permit more. Additional evidence will be presented in subsequent papers on LN. This will take the form of extending the language to additional constructs of natural language, and further analysis of reasoning in £N to establish further connections with natural language reasoning.
In the first direction, L,N will be extended to include generalized quantifiers of natural language. The cardinal quantifiers at least k can be axiomatized much the same as some, requiring the addition of two axiom schemas and a rule of inference. exactly k and less than k can then be introduced by definition. The second-order quantifier most can also be axiomatized, bllt here completeness requires restriction of model size to not exceed some fixed limit N. Monotonicity properties and conversion rules can then be derived. This can be accomplished by definition in first-order logic with identity; the axiomatization in LN is equivalent.
In the second direction, reasoning in .eN will be investigated in relation to Hintikka's notion of surface information [4] . Hintikka has suggested that natural language meaning and understanding are best understood in terms of surface information, that is, the results of deduction in which depth does not exceed that of the premises. Here depth is defined as the maximum number of nested quantifiers or the maximum number of individuals simultaneously considered. When depth is allowed to increase beyond that of the premises, depth information is produced. This seems to closely match the intuitive notion of reasoning involved in natural language understanding. The reasoning in the examples of the previous section illustrate this. The distinction is not only a philosophical one. It also promises to shed light on the kinds of reasoning that characterize natural language understanding.
